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Abandoning the Subjective and Objective 




Current asylum law requires that asylum seekers prove that they have a “well-
founded fear of persecution.” However, a “well-founded fear”—the evidentiary standard 
in asylum cases—has remained ambiguous and difficult to apply in asylum cases. In 
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court held that an asylum seeker can establish a well-
founded fear with less than a 50% probability of future persecution. Although the Supreme 
Court sought to clarify the meaning of a well-founded fear, the decision has complicated 
the evidentiary standard by implying that it consists of two parts: the subjective component 
and objective component. The “subjective” component—the asylum seekers’ subjective 
fear of being persecuted if they return to their home countries—is superfluous because this 
component is rarely contested. The subjective component is essentially a non-issue because 
asylum seekers can prove this component by stating that they are afraid to go back to their 
home countries. The objective component—whether asylum seekers’ fears are objectively 
reasonable—remains unclear. Moreover, courts have misapplied the well-founded fear 
standard and interpreted the objective component in inconsistent ways. Thus, this Note 
argues that the Supreme Court should eliminate the subjective component in the well-
founded fear analysis and assume that asylum seekers have a genuine fear if they submit 
an application. In addition, the Supreme Court should simplify the objectively reasonable 
fear analysis to “a reasonable possibility of persecution,” which would be a 10% chance 
of persecution. A reasonable possibility of persecution would emphasize how a well-
founded fear points to a threshold or probability of persecution rather than a separate, 
convoluted analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, a thirty-eight-year-old woman from Nicaragua, faced 
deportation because she first entered the United States as a visitor and overstayed her visa.1 
In response, she requested asylum in the United States because her life would be threatened 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. I am grateful for Professor Joyce A. Hughes 
and Professor Uzoamaka Nzelibe’s guidance and support in writing this Note. I also want to thank the 
hardworking editors of Northwestern’s Journal of Law and Social Policy who made this publication 
possible. Finally, I am grateful for my loving family and friends for encouraging me through this process.   
1 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987); Cardoza-Fonseca v. U.S. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1450 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
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if she returned to Nicaragua.2 Her brother had been imprisoned and tortured because of his 
oppositional political activities against the Sandinistas government, and Cardoza-Fonseca 
believed that the Sandinistas knew that they fled together.3  Her asylum case led to the 
Supreme Court decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, a ground-breaking case that attempted 
to clarify the meaning of a “well-founded fear of persecution,” the evidentiary standard in 
asylum cases.4 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding by a plurality and 
held that the “well-founded fear” standard was a more generous standard than the “clear 
probability” or “more likely than not” standard of proof, which requires an asylum seeker 
to prove that their claims occurred by more than a 50% chance.5 In other words, the well-
founded fear standard is a burden of proof that requires some probability above 0% but not 
as high as 50%.6 However, the Court did not definitively decide what amount of evidence 
would be necessary to show that an asylum seeker met the requisite burden of proof.7 Thus, 
while Cardoza-Fonseca was able to significantly improve her chances at obtaining asylum, 
she and other applicants faced an uncertain future, as the lower courts could decide how 
generously they would apply this standard.   
The Court also held that a well-founded fear included both a subjective and objective 
component, both of which the asylum seeker must establish.8 The “subjective” component 
describes asylum seekers’ subjective fear of being persecuted if they return to their home 
countries.9 The “objective” component refers to the objective situation that asylum seekers 
must establish through evidence to help corroborate the subjective mental state.10 Although 
a well-founded fear is necessary in both past persecution and future persecution claims, in 
past persecution claims, the asylum applicant already has a presumption of having a well-
founded fear, albeit a rebuttable one.11 The subjective and objective components become 
more important factors in future persecution claims. 12  In practice, the subjective and 
objective components have become separate components that an asylum seeker must prove 
in future persecution claims in addition to the other statutory elements of being a refugee: 
persecution, the nexus/causation, and the five protected grounds.13 The Court’s explanation 
regarding the subjective and objective components to a well-founded fear of future 
persecution further complicates an already ambiguous standard.14   
These additional components that asylum seekers must prove are problematic 
because the subjective component is superfluous, and the objective component is confusing 
for courts to apply. First, while the subjective component is less problematic, since parties 
rarely contest the subjective component in asylum cases, it becomes unnecessary in the 
 
2 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424.  
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 427–50. 
5 Id. at 425, 431, 450. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 449–50. 
8 Id. at 430–31. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 440. 
11 See Humberto H. Ocariz & Jorge L. Lopez, Practical Implications of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: 
Evidencing Eligibility for Asylum under the “Well-Founded Fear of Persecution” Standard, 19 U.  MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 617, 644 n.189 (1988). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 644. 
14 Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430–31. 
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overall analysis of whether an applicant should be granted asylum. 15  The subjective 
component is essentially a non-issue because the asylum seekers can prove this component 
by stating that they are afraid to go back to their home country.16 Ocariz and Lopez discuss 
the implications of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca in their article, Practical Implications of INS 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Evidencing Eligibility for Asylum under the “Well-Founded Fear of 
Persecution” Standard, stating that “an alien’s fear is generally not questioned” and a 
court’s discussion of a person’s fear “is no more than formalism.”17 Ocariz and Lopez 
explain how the United National Handbook assumes that unless a person just wants to seek 
adventure, no one would normally abandon one’s home and country without some 
compelling reason.18  
Second, the objective component of the well-founded fear standard leads to 
confusion because the Supreme Court has not sufficiently clarified how to apply the 
objective element.19 The Court simply stated that it did not “attempt to set forth a detailed 
description of how the well-founded fear test should be applied.”20 Instead, the Court stated 
that there should be “case-by-case adjudication,” which respects the agency’s interpretation 
of any ambiguity Congress intentionally created through the language of well-founded 
fear. 21  This ambiguity has led to lower courts inconsistently applying the objective 
component in asylum claims.22  
As shown in Part II, the Court’s decision has led the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) and various circuit courts to use the objective component of a well-founded fear to 
repetitively analyze all three of the elements for meeting refugee status—the persecution, 
the protected grounds the alien is claiming, and the nexus or causation between the 
persecution and protected category—within the well-founded fear analysis.23 However, in 
future persecution claims, the “objectively reasonable fear” is supposed to be a minimal 
burden of proof that can be framed as a probability of an asylum seeker facing persecution 
if he or she returns to his or her home country.24 Courts often conflate the well-founded 
fear analysis, which refers to the future probability of persecution, with the rest of the 
analysis regarding the elements of being a refugee.25 Thus, the confusion of how to apply 
the well-founded fear standard can lead courts to engage in a more convoluted analysis of 
objectively reasonable fear. The Supreme Court should clarify that a well-founded fear is 
 
15 Ocariz & Lopez, supra note 11.  
16 Id. at 645. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. The UN Handbook is a document that explains the UN procedures and criteria for determining 
refugee status and other matters. 
19 Infra Part II.  
20 INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448. 
21 Id. There are various agencies that handle immigration affairs: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2021); U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/ 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2021); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/ (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2021); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2021). 
22 Infra Part II. 
23 Infra Part II. 
24 See INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
25 Infra Part II. 
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not a separate element that must be established when demonstrating future persecution but 
an evidentiary burden that refers to the likelihood of the persecution.  
In addition, even though the well-founded fear standard does not require the asylum 
seeker to show that the probability of persecution is more than 50%, the BIA and the circuit 
courts have not agreed on what burden of proof this standard actually entails.26 Given the 
ambiguity, jurisdictions may choose to interpret this burden of proof as leniently or strictly 
as they choose, whether that is applying a 5% chance of persecution or a 45% chance of 
persecution. Cardoza-Fonseca suggested that a 10% chance of persecution may be 
sufficient to show a well-founded fear, and some circuits have adopted this view.27 In 
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court used a hypothetical example to illuminate what 
could be a well-founded fear of persecution:  
Let us . . . presume that it is known that in the applicant’s country of origin 
every tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote 
labor camp. . . In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who 
has managed to escape from the country in question will have a “well-
founded fear of persecution” upon his eventual return.28   
Some courts have chosen to adopt this language while others have completely ignored this 
part of the Supreme Court opinion.29  
The BIA has tried to use language stating than an alien has an objective fear if a 
“reasonable person in their circumstances would fear persecution were they in their home 
country” in order to clarify the objective standard.30 Applicants would need “credible, 
direct, specific evidence” to support their claims.31 However, the language that the BIA 
uses is not even applied in all circuit courts.32 Thus, there is no uniformity regarding the 
interpretation of the statutory language, and the BIA and the circuit courts adjudicate 
claims about an asylum seeker’s well-founded fear of future persecution in different ways.  
Thus, the well-founded fear of future persecution standard should be simplified to 
mean a reasonable possibility of persecution in light of the circumstances of the asylum 
seeker. The subjective and objective aspects of a well-founded fear of persecution 
unnecessarily complicate the analysis. The Supreme Court should eliminate the subjective 
component in the well-founded fear analysis because the asylum seeker should be 
presumed to have a genuine fear if the person submits an application. In addition, the 
Supreme Court should change the objectively reasonable fear analysis to “a reasonable 
possibility of persecution” in order to simplify the meaning of a well-founded fear of 
persecution. A reasonable possibility of persecution would emphasize how a well-founded 
fear points to a threshold or probability of persecution. The Supreme Court should clarify 
 
26 See id. 
27 See Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2001). 
28 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431 (quoting ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1966)).  
29 See Infra Part I. 
30 Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986); Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 68 (2d 
Cir. 1986); In re C-A-L-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 754, 759 (BIA 1997); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 
445 (BIA 1987).  
31 Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 444 (quoting Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
32 See Infra Part I(a), (b).  
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that the objective component is not a separate analysis that must be applied to every 
element of proving one’s refugee status but is an evidentiary burden that refers to the 
likelihood of the future persecution. A “reasonable possibility” of at least a ten-percent 
chance of persecution, as suggested in the example used in Cardoza-Fonseca, should 
suffice to show a well-founded fear. The ten-percent standard would enable courts to 
adjudicate decisions based on a specific frame of reference and take into account the 
humanitarian concerns that inspired asylum law.33 
Part I provides a general overview of asylum law so that readers can better 
understand the structure of asylum claims. Part II showcases how the ambiguity regarding 
the objective component has led to a plethora of confusing administrative and court 
opinions that do not properly determine whether an asylum seeker has a well-founded 
fear.34 Part II will analyze how the BIA and the circuit courts structure their analysis of the 
objective component of a well-founded fear in future persecution claims and what kind of 
evidentiary burden the BIA and circuit courts are using to prove a well-founded fear.35 Part 
II will also argue that the BIA and various circuit courts’ objective fear analysis forces 
asylum seekers to present the same evidence that proves the substantive three elements of 
being a refugee, which is redundant and unnecessary. Instead, the well-founded fear 
element should simply address whether the asylum seeker has a well-founded fear based 
in reality. Furthermore, the BIA and some circuit courts do not clearly discern which of the 
three substantive elements are problematic in an asylum seeker’s case and have improperly 
collapsed the three-step analysis under the well-founded fear of persecution. These courts 
then present a generic argument that the asylum seekers failed to show an objective, well-
founded fear.36 This Part also delves into how the circuit courts interpret the standard for 
an objective, well-founded fear of persecution in strikingly different ways and how the 
circuit courts are prone to use the standard that they desire depending on the case.  
Part III delves into the repercussions of confusion in the well-founded fear of 
persecution analysis. It shows how ambiguity has created an additional burden for 
practitioners and the potential to allow dangerous biases to affect the adjudication 
process. 37  This Part will explain how the lack of structure and clarity in the courts’ 
evaluation of the objective component leads to both a redundant and confusing analysis 
that does not properly interpret the well-founded fear that asylum seekers must prove. Part 
IV provides suggestions for how the interpretation of a well-founded fear can be 
streamlined for a uniform application in future cases. Part V offers concluding thoughts 
about the urgency and importance of implementing changes to the application of a well-
founded fear.  
I. OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM LAW 
Asylum law in the United States is based on international law and its legal obligations 
under the Refugee Convention.38 The United States ratified the United Nations Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees in 1968, and it adopted the Convention’s definition of a 
 
33 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431. 
34 See Infra Part II. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.  
37 See infra Part III.  
38 See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:1 (2020 ed.). 
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“refugee” and codified procedures for how to apply for asylum status in the Refugee Act 
of 1980.39 Since Congress amended its immigration laws, United States administrative and 
judicial authorities have developed a complex body of law that elaborates on who can claim 
asylum status and is legally a refugee.40  
Under United States law, the grant of asylum is discretionary and is based on the 
definition of a refugee.41 The Immigration and Nationality Act defines refugees as aliens 
who are unable or unwilling to return to their native countries “because of persecution or a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”42  The definition of a refugee includes three 
main elements: (1) “persecution,” (2) the “on account of” nexus element, and (3) the 
statutorily protected grounds, which include “race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”43 First, asylum seekers must show that they 
suffered severe harm that rises to the level of persecution.44 Severe harm can include 
physical violence, mental and psychological harm, forced renunciation of beliefs, 
economic harm, and discrimination generally.45 The persecution must also involve some 
absence of state protection, whether that is because the state is unable or unwilling to 
protect the asylum seeker.46 Second, the “on account of” nexus element proves causality 
and shows that the persecution occurred because the applicant is part of a protected class.47 
Claimants are not required to establish nexus through direct proof, and circumstantial proof 
regarding country condition reports, treatment of others in similar circumstances, and past 
actions or statements of the persecutor may be enough.48 Third, “race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” are the only grounds upon 
which applicants can claim asylum.49 The BIA has described the grounds of persecution as 
identifying qualities of fundamental difference or immutability, and asylum seekers can 
claim one or more of these protected grounds.50 
 
39 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for 
signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 
Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.A.). 
40 ANKER, supra note 38. 
41 Id. at § 2:1. 
42 Immigration and Nationality Act §101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
116-188). 
43 AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., ET. AL., FRAGOMEN ON IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS § 6:2 (5th ed. 2015). 
44 ANKER, supra note 38, at § 4:12. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at § 4:8. 
47 Id. at § 5:1. 
48 RAIO Combined Training Course, Nexus and the Protected Grounds 19 (Apr. 30, 2013), available 
at perma.cc/N5J6-Y9AP (removed from USCIS website) (“Often, an applicant will not be able to provide 
direct evidence of motive, since persecutors usually do not announce their motives or explain their 
actions.”); see also Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Persecutors do not 
always take the time to tell their victims all the reasons they are being beaten, kidnapped, or killed.” 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Gafoor v. I.N.S., 231 F.3d 645, 650, 55 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1006, 177 
A.L.R. Fed. 687 (9th Cir. 2000))); I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483, 112 S. Ct. 812, 117 L. Ed. 
2d 38 (1992) (“[Petitioner] objects that he cannot be expected to provide direct proof of his persecutors' 
motives. We do not require that.”). 
49 AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR., supra note 43. 
50 See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (overruled in part on other grounds 
by, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987)) (“Each of these grounds describes persecution 
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The definition of a refugee also includes a well-founded fear of persecution, which 
is the standard of proof for asylum claims. Asylum seekers have the burden of proof to 
demonstrate persecution in asylum proceedings and can broadly assert two different kinds 
of claims: past persecution and future persecution claims. 51  As mentioned in the 
Introduction, an applicant who has established a past persecution claim has a presumption 
of a well-founded fear of future persecution.52 However, asylum officers or immigration 
judges can rebut the presumption if the government shows by a preponderance of the 
evidence that (1) there has been a fundamental change in circumstances or (2) the applicant 
can relocate to another part of the country and avoid future persecution.53 As explained 
above, an applicant seeking to establish a future persecution claim must demonstrate a 
well-founded fear of persecution according to Cardoza-Fonseca, which includes a 
subjective and objective component.54  
Applicants can meet their burden of proof through their own testimonies, especially 
since courts have recognized the difficulty of collecting evidence when asylum seekers are 
running for their lives.55 Under the REAL ID Act of 2005, the testimony of an applicant 
may be sufficient to sustain one’s burden of proof without additional corroboration if the 
trier-of-fact finds that the applicant’s testimony is credible, persuasive, and refers to 
specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.56 Thus, for many 
asylum seekers who do not have much corroborating evidence, their credibility 
determinations often decide the fates of their cases. The difficulty of finding corroborating 
evidence further highlights the importance of clarifying the evidentiary burden required by 
a well-founded fear of persecution. 
II. THE BIA AND CIRCUIT COURTS’ MUDDLED INTERPRETATIONS OF AN OBJECTIVE, 
WELL-FOUNDED FEAR 
This Note analyzes cases from the BIA, the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and 
the Eleventh Circuit to demonstrate how courts have chosen significantly different 
interpretations and methods to apply the well-founded fear standard in asylum cases. The 
BIA decisions show how the BIA reviews cases appealed from an Immigration Judge (IJ) 
and how it analyzes the “objective fear” component. The case law of the three circuit courts 
reveals a wide ideological spectrum and demonstrates how each circuit reviews 
determinations about an asylum applicant’s “objective fear” very differently. The Seventh 
Circuit decisions showcase how a circuit that has a reputation for adopting more moderate 
views, at least compared to the Ninth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, reviews asylum 
 
aimed at an immutable characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to 
change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be 
changed.” (citations omitted)); ANKER, supra note 38, at § 5.16. 
51 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13, 1208.13. 
52 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(1) (“An applicant who has been found to have established … past 
persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original 
claim.”). 
53 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i), 1208.13(b)(1)(i). 
54 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1987). 
55 Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); 
56 Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
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cases. 57  The Seventh Circuit also has a significant amount of experience reviewing 
immigration cases because of its jurisdiction over Chicago, which has historically been a 
sanctuary city for immigrants.58 The Ninth Circuit decisions display how one of the most 
liberal circuit courts that has often blocked policies that are unfavorable to asylum seekers 
reviews appeals from the BIA. 59  The Ninth Circuit is also important because it has 
adjudicated the most asylum cases.60 The Eleventh Circuit decisions demonstrate how a 
more conservative circuit, which includes three states in the “Deep South,” decides asylum 
cases in its jurisdiction.61 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has one of the lowest remand rates 
for asylum cases appealed by asylum seekers.62 
Circuit courts review cases differently from the BIA because the circuit courts 
reviewing BIA decisions have to give deference to the factual findings.63 The courts must 
evaluate whether the BIA’s findings of fact are supported by “substantial evidence,” which 
courts have held to mean what a “reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the 
requisite fear of persecution existed.”64 The courts review legal conclusions de novo, but 
they must apply Chevron deference for certain agency interpretations of statutes. 65 
Nonetheless, comparing the logic of various circuit courts exposes the confusion that arises 
without a clear standard for well-founded fear and the resulting inconsistencies in 
evaluating the objective component. Although this case study examines only a fraction of 
the judicial immigration system, analyzing these circuits will demonstrate how the absence 
of a clear standard for objective fear has led to disparate results. 
 
57 See Pratt School of Information, Circuit Court Map, VISUAL FIRST AMENDMENT, 
http://visualfa.org/circuit-court-map/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2019). 
58 See Mauricio Peña, How Does Chicago’s Sanctuary Law Stack Up Against Other Cities, CHIC. 
MAGAZINE (July 17, 2017), https://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/July-2017/Chicagos-Welcoming-City-
Ordinance/. 
59 See Ross Todd, 9th Circuit Upholds 2 Injunctions Blocking Trump Asylum Changes, LAW.COM (Feb. 28, 
2020), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/02/28/ninth-circuit-upholds-nationwide-injunction-blocking-
trump-asylum-changes/; See Pratt School of Information, supra note 57. The U.S. Department of Justice’s 
statistics also showcase that cities in the Ninth Circuit have some of the lowest denial rates. See U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, STATISTICS YEARBOOK FISCAL YEAR 2017 at 28, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1107056/download. 
60 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN 
ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 82 (2009); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 59, at 9. 
61 See Suzanne Monyak, Murdered Sisters Not Enough To Win Asylum, 11th Cir. Says, LAW360, (Jan. 23, 
2020, 7:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1237065/murdered-sisters-not-enough-to-win-asylum-
11th-circ-says; See Pratt School of Information, supra note 57. 
62 RAMJI-NOGALES, supra note 60, at 67. 
63 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 (1992).  
64 Id.; Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). 
65 See Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1995). The Chevron doctrine provides a framework for 
when courts must defer to agency interpretations of statutes. First, a court must examine whether Congress 
has clearly spoken on an issue and if the agency’s interpretation follows Congress’s intent. Second, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous on an issue, then the court must decide if the agency’s interpretation is based 
on a permissible interpretation of the statute. An agency has the power to interpret statutes if Congress 
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill. In this case, the agency’s interpretation is subject to deference 
provided that it is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. If Congress implicitly left a 
gap for the agency to fill, then courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as the interpretation 
is reasonable. 6 Administrative Law § 51.01 (2020). 
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A. Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions 
Soon after the Supreme Court decided INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the BIA sought to 
further clarify how a well-founded fear of persecution could be applied in asylum cases. In 
1987, in Matter of Mogharrabi, the BIA concluded that the asylum seeker Mogharrabi 
would have a well-founded fear of persecution if he were returned to Iran.66 The BIA 
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s view that the objective component requires an asylum seeker 
to use “credible, direct, and specific evidence” to support a reasonable fear of 
persecution.67 As an initial matter, the BIA assessed Mogharrabi’s credibility and found 
that the record supported that he was credible, which fulfilled the evidentiary burden to 
show he had a well-founded fear.68 The BIA then provided four factors to help define a 
well-founded fear: (1) the claimant possesses a belief or characteristic the persecutor seeks 
to overcome, (2) the persecutor is already aware or there is a reasonable possibility the 
persecutor could become aware that the claimant possesses this belief or characteristic, (3) 
the persecutor has the capability of punishing the claimant, and (4) the persecutor has the 
inclination to punish the claimant.69 If the claimant fulfills all four factors, then an asylum 
seeker likely has a well-founded fear of persecution.70  
The four-factor test, although promising, still has the effect of forcing asylum seekers 
to repeat the same information that they would already have to present to prove other 
elements of being a refugee.71 The first factor of whether the applicant has a belief or 
characteristic the persecutor seeks to overcome is redundant because asylum seekers have 
to already prove separately that they are being persecuted “on account of” a “race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”72 Although the 
remaining factors also attempt to clarify the evidentiary burden of the well-founded fear 
standard, the last three factors have a repetitive effect because they also address the “on 
account of” nexus that an asylum seeker has to prove anyway.73 Thus, due to the structure 
of the well-founded fear analysis, the asylum applicant must prove similar components 
twice when trying to prove that she has a well-founded fear and then prove the general 
statutory elements of being a refugee. 
Furthermore, despite the BIA’s efforts to clarify the well-founded fear standard in 
Matter of Mogharrabi, the BIA failed to delineate what probability of persecution would 
satisfy the objective component of the well-founded fear analysis.74 The BIA here adopted 
the Fifth Circuit position that a person has established a well-founded fear if “a reasonable 
person in his circumstances would fear persecution.”75 The BIA further elaborated that an 
applicant has established a well-founded fear when a “reasonable person may 
well fear persecution even where its likelihood is significantly less than clearly 
probable.”76 However, the BIA did not mention the 10% chance of persecution standard 
 
66 Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 448–49 (BIA 1987).  
67 Id. at 444.  
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 446. 
70 Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987). 
71 Id.  
72 Immigration and Nationality Act 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); Mogharrabi, 19 I.&N. Dec. at 446. 
73 Mogharrabi, 19 I.&N. Dec. at 446. 
74 Id. at 445.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
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derived from the Supreme Court’s Cardoza-Fonseca hypothetical example, or any 
numerical probability, as a way to frame the evidentiary burden.77 
Indeed, the Mogharrabi factors have arguably only led to more confusion in how to 
analyze whether an applicant has a well-founded fear because the factors are not applied 
consistently in BIA cases or in the circuit courts. The BIA suggests that adjudicators should 
use these factors moving forward to clarify the analysis regarding a well-founded fear.78 A 
January 2019 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Officer Training manual 
also recommended using these four factors.79 However, many of the circuit court cases 
addressing the objective component of an asylum seeker’s fear often do not mention the 
Mogharrabi factors, and the proper use of the objective standard still remains unclear.80 
In 1997, ten years after Mogharrabi was decided, the BIA case In re C-A-L 
showcased the limited and confusing applicability that Matter of Mogharrabi has had on 
future adjudications.81 In this case, the BIA denied the applicant’s appeal from an IJ’s 
decision that denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal.82 The BIA 
cited Mogharrabi to explain the well-founded fear standard, which is established if the 
asylum applicant shows “that a ‘reasonable person’ in his circumstances 
would fear persecution upon return to his native country.”83 Yet the BIA failed to mention 
any of the Mogharrabi factors.84  This absence shows the limited applicability of the 
Mogharrabi standard and demonstrates how the well-founded fear standard may be applied 
differently even within the BIA itself. Mogharrabi’s failure to delineate the applicant’s 
burden of proof also permeates this BIA decision. Although the majority opinion would 
deny applying a higher burden of proof, the dissenting opinion points out that the majority 
seemed to have denied the asylum seeker’s application because it applied a burden of proof 
that is higher than the one in ten chance of suffering persecution standard that the Supreme 
Court set forth.85  Thus, In re C-A-L demonstrates how the ambiguity regarding what 
probability would satisfy the well-founded fear standard allows the BIA to inconsistently 
apply the well-founded fear standard in each case that it adjudicates.  
B. Seventh Circuit Decisions 
The Seventh Circuit also applies the objective component of a well-founded fear on 
its own terms by not using the BIA’s Mogharrabi framework and generally defining an 
objectively reasonable fear as “a reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution.”86 In 
Bereza v. INS, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the objective component of Bereza’s future 
persecution claim and concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision 
that Bereza was not entitled to asylum.87 Bereza claimed that he would be persecuted based 
 
77 Id. 
78 See RAIO Combined Training Course: Well-Founded Fear, RAIO (December 20, 2019) 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/Well_Founded_Fear_LP_RAIO.pdf. 
79 Id. 
80 Infra Part II(B), Part II(C), Part II(D). 
81 In re C-A-L, 211 I.&N. Dec. 754 (BIA 1997). 
82 Id. at 756. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 754. 
85 Id. at 767. 
86 Bereza v. INS, 115 F.3d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)). 
87 Id.  
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on his political opinion.88 He presented evidence from his past, explaining that his mother 
was an anti-Stalinist political prisoner, that he participated in political protests in Ukraine, 
and that he experienced backlash and discrimination throughout his life.89  
The Seventh Circuit did not explain which part of Bereza’s asylum claim failed the 
Mogharrabi factors as a framework. Instead, it provided a list of evidence that countered 
Bereza’s future persecution claim. 90  The court explained that the Soviet Union was 
dissolved, and that the Communist party was illegal.91 The court also referenced a United 
States State Department report that noted there was little likelihood that the current 
Ukrainian security forces would mistreat individuals because of their support for Ukrainian 
independence at some time in the past, even though the security forces were made up of 
some of the same members as before Ukraine’s independence. 92  Here, the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis is problematic because the court essentially attacked the nexus element 
of the asylum seeker’s claim without stating that the nexus was the element that the asylum 
seeker had failed to prove. Thus, analyzing whether someone has an objective, well-
founded fear of persecution has led to an ineffective analysis in which the court not only 
re-analyzes the elements of being a refugee but also presents all the weak evidence of an 
asylum seeker’s claim to justify a denial of an application, without specifying which part 
of the definition of a refugee the asylum seeker has failed to prove.  
Regarding the evidentiary burden, the Seventh Circuit defined an objectively 
reasonable fear as “a reasonable possibility of actually suffering such persecution.”93 In 
Bereza, the Seventh Circuit also addressed the reasonable possibility of suffering 
persecution but did not elucidate what threshold a petitioner would have to reach in order 
to show a reasonable possibility.94 Again, there is no mention of a 10% possibility of 
persecution that the Supreme Court suggested in its hypothetical or any kind of percentage 
that would guide the court in determining the asylum seeker’s burden of proof.  
In a more recent case, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the BIA’s holding that an 
asylum seeker did not have an objective basis for her asylum claim, and the Seventh Circuit 
pointed to how the BIA failed to engage in a robust analysis of the asylum seeker’s 
evidence.95 In Oyekunle v. Gonzales, a Nigerian woman applied for asylum because she 
feared that her husband and father-in-law would force her to undergo female circumcision 
if she was returned to Nigeria.96 Her husband protected her against the procedure at first, 
but he changed his mind when his father refused to let him inherit his father’s farm if he 
did not circumcise his wife.97 The BIA relied on a “country report, [a] lawyer’s letter, and 
the husband’s apology” to conclude that her fear was not well-founded and had no 
objective basis.98  
 
88 Id. at 476. 
89 Id. at 470–71. 
90 See Bereza, 115 F.3d. at 474.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 474 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)). 
94 See Bereza, 115 F.3d at 474.  
95 Oyekunle v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2007). 
96 Id. at 716. 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 716–17. 
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Interestingly, Circuit Judge Posner, who wrote the opinion for the court, did not 
frame the well-founded fear analysis in terms of the subjective and objective component.99 
Instead, Posner analyzed whether Oyekunle had a well-founded fear by scrutinizing the 
evidence the BIA chose to use to support its decision.100 The Seventh Circuit ultimately 
determined that Oyekunle’s evidence was not inconsistent with her claim of a well-founded 
fear.101 Posner commented on how the country report which the BIA relied on had little 
bearing on the case.102 The report showed that the Nigerian region where Oyekunle's 
father-in-law lived had outlawed female circumcision, but the findings did not negate the 
fact that her father-in-law still wanted to and could circumcise her in another part of 
Nigeria.103 In addition, the BIA used the claimant’s lawyer’s letter from three years prior 
telling the petitioner to not return to Nigeria until the situation “cooled down” to argue 
much time had passed and the circumstances in her region may be better.104 However, 
Posner noted that the BIA was speculating, and the lawyer’s comments from three years 
prior did not make the asylum seeker’s claim more or less probable.105 Finally, Posner 
emphasized that the husband’s letter of apology did not actually indicate whether the 
husband would protect his wife if she returned or would succumb to his father’s wishes in 
order to receive the farm as an inheritance.106  Posner explained that these documents did 
not discredit the asylum seeker’s own testimony, and thus, all of her evidence either 
supported or was at least consistent with her fear of persecution.107 Judge Posner’s opinion 
demonstrates how the lack of clarity and guidance regarding the application of the objective 
component can lead the BIA to insufficiently analyze asylum seekers’ claims. Specifically, 
Posner exposes how the BIA uses one-sided evidence to justify its decision without 
evaluating the quality of the evidence itself.   
Judge Posner also commented that the objective component the BIA relied on is 
basically analogous to the showing of a well-founded fear. He commented that “requiring 
that an ‘objective basis’ be shown for a ‘well-founded fear’ is redundant; a well-founded, 
as distinct from a groundless, fear has by definition an objective basis.” 108  Posner’s 
comments expose how the objective component has become a separate analysis, even when 
the point is to meet a threshold in which one has a well-founded fear that is grounded in 
reality. Thus, Posner writes that “[t]he Board should resist the urge to multiply entities” of 
analysis, which serve as superfluous elements for asylum seekers to prove and muddles the 
analysis for future persecution claims.109 Although Posner does not discuss the fact that the 
objective component should refer to a certain possibility of facing persecution, his 
 
99  Judge Posner only referred to the subjective fear of persecution to say that “the Board did not question 
the accuracy of her testimony, holding only that it did not demonstrate an objective, as distinct from her 
subjective, fear of persecution.” Oyekunle, 498 F.3d at 716. In addition, Judge Posner only referred to the 
objective component to comment upon how the BIA used the language “objective basis” to analyze the 
asylum seeker’s claim. See id. at 717. 
100 Id. at 717. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 716. 
103 Id.   
104 Id. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 716–17.  
107 Id. at 718.  
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
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statement captures how the objective analysis has failed to fulfill its intended purpose and 
taken a life of its own.   
The absence of discussion regarding the 10% chance of persecution in Bereza and 
Oyekunle is in stark contrast to how another Seventh Circuit case called Kllokoqi v. 
Gonzales articulated its legal standards.110 The court in Kllokoqi, which decided the case 
two years before Oyekunle, remanded the asylum claim because the IJ failed to fully 
consider all Kllokoqi’s arguments.111 Here, the court defined a well-founded fear as a 
“reasonable possibility of future persecution,” but it explicitly stated that “the applicant 
may establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution by showing that there is even 
a 10 percent chance that he will be shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted.”112 Thus, these 
decisions showcase how the ambiguity of the well-founded fear standard continues to 
impact courts like the Seventh Circuit and causes courts to inconsistently define and apply 
the well-founded fear standard, even within their own jurisdictions.   
C. Ninth Circuit Decisions 
Similarly to the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit explained that a well-founded fear  
meant a “reasonable possibility” of persecution.113 However, the Ninth Circuit consistently 
mentions that a 10% chance of persecution is enough to establish a well-founded fear.114 
In Melkonian v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the asylum seeker’s 
subjective fear of future persecution was objectively reasonable, ultimately finding it 
was.115 The asylum seeker was an ethnic Armenian and Christian who lived in Abkhazia, 
Georgia.116 At the time, ethnic-Abkhaz Separatists were engaging in ethnic cleansing.117 
He fled across the Russian border to escape kidnaping by Separatists.118 When the court 
adjudicated Melkonian’s future persecution claim, it stated that the proper inquiry in this 
asylum case was whether Melkonian’s refusal to return to Abkhazia was based on a 
credible subjective fear of persecution by the Abkhaz, whether the persecution he feared 
was on account of a statutorily protected ground, and whether the fear was objectively 
reasonable.119  
 
110 See Oyekunle v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 715, 716–18 (7th Cir. 2007); Kllokoqi v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 336, 
344–45 (7th Cir. 2005). 
111 Kllokoqi, 439 F.3d at 344. 
112 Id. at 345. 
113 See Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003); Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 
(9th Cir. 2001); Bereza v. INS, 115 F.3d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)). 
114 See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Because asylum is a discretionary form of 
relief, the standard for objective reasonableness is fairly low: Even a ten percent chance of 
future persecution may establish a well-founded fear.”); Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“Even a ten percent chance that the applicant will be persecuted in the future is enough to 
establish a well-founded fear.”); Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d at 1069 (“To satisfy the objective 
component of the well-founded fear test, an applicant need only produce credible evidence that persecution 
is a ‘reasonable possibility.’ (ten percent probability sufficient).”) (citations omitted); Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 
F.3d at 888 (“A well-founded fear does not, however, require proof that persecution is more likely than 
not; even a ten percent chance of persecution may establish a well-founded fear.”) (citations omitted).  
115 Melkonian, 320 F.3d at 1069. 
116 Id. at 1064. 
117 Id. at 1065. 
118 Id. at 1064. 
119 Id. at 1068 
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When the court analyzed the “objectively reasonable” component, it proceeded to 
use the reasoning that it should be using to establish the applicable protected classes and 
the nexus factor (the causation between the persecution and the protected grounds). The 
court discussed how the Separatists not only persecuted Melkonian because of his failure 
to fight for them but also because he was part of various other protected classes.120 The 
court concluded that he was persecuted because of his “prior support for the Georgians 
(political opinion), and because he [was] an Armenian (ethnicity) and a Christian 
(religion).”121  Thus, the court was not analyzing whether Melkonian’s fear was well-
founded; the court was evaluating whether there was a nexus between the protected classes 
and the persecution. Here, the court’s analysis of the objective component of a “well-
founded fear” improperly analyzes the facts underlying the substantive elements instead of 
confirming or denying that an applicant faced a certain possibility of future persecution 
based on the established facts.  
Interestingly, in Melkonian, the Ninth Circuit explicitly mentioned that a 10% 
probability of persecution would be enough. 122  The court stated that to “satisfy the 
objective component of the well-founded fear test, an applicant need only produce credible 
evidence that persecution is a “reasonable possibility” and cited to INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 
to show that a 10% probability would be “sufficient.”123 It also noted that a way to support 
one’s burden of proof is through credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record.124 In 
the end, the court used the 10% probability standard to say that the “evidence compels the 
conclusion that Melkonian has more than met his burden.”125  
Another Ninth Circuit case similarly addressed the objective component of the 
asylum seeker’s case by repeating points that asylum seekers already have to show to 
receive refugee status. In Al-Harbi v. INS, the Ninth Circuit held that the asylum seeker 
fulfilled the objective component of his asylum claim in spite of the fact that he had an 
adverse credibility determination by the IJ and the BIA.126 Al-Harbi was a Shia’a Muslim 
from Iraq who deserted the Iraqi army, rejoined the army later on, and later protested the 
presidential election in which Hussein was the only candidate.127 Al-Harbi’s friends who 
aided him in passing anti-government flyers were arrested, and Al-Harbi eventually fled to 
Guam.128  
Because the Ninth Circuit treats the objective component as a separate element that 
asylum seekers must establish, the objective part of the analysis proves to be a reiteration 
of what asylum seekers have already tried to demonstrate in different parts of their cases. 
For example, in Al-Harbi, the court applied the well-founded fear standard to each of the 
three elements needed to prove that one is a refugee, although the court did not explicitly 
say so. First, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the claim that the 
Iraqi government would consider the petitioner a dissident because of his association with 
the American airlift of Iraqi dissidents, and he would be considered a dissident for this 
 
120 Id. at 1069. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. (citation omitted). 
124 Id. at 1065. 
125 Id. at 1069. 
126 Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001). 
127 Id. at 885. 
128 Id. 
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reason, thereby addressing whether the asylum seeker is in a protected group.129 Second, 
the court determined that the asylum seeker would likely face harms that result in the death 
penalty, thus establishing that the harms did rise to the level of persecution.130 Third, the 
court discussed whether Iraq would regard all the evacuees as traitors and persecute them, 
which appears to be analyzing whether there is a nexus between the persecution and the 
imputed political opinion.131 Although the court structured its analysis of an objective fear 
of persecution in an organized manner, the petitioner essentially had to prove the elements 
of being a refugee twice because he not only had to prove the three elements of being a 
refugee, but also had to address the same points regarding level of persecution, statutorily 
protected groups, and nexus in discussing his objectively reasonable fear of persecution.  
However, the court in Al-Harbi properly interpreted the objective component as a 
way to determine the probability of persecution, similarly to how the court analyzed 
Melkonian.132 Rather than listing all the evidence in favor or against the asylum seeker in 
a haphazard fashion, the court focused on how the evidence made the possibility of 
persecution more or less likely.133 The Ninth Circuit stated that “the principal question, 
then, is whether there is sufficient likelihood that Petitioner would be persecuted for 
political beliefs that his persecutors would impute to him.”134 Although the “sufficient 
likelihood” language in this case is different from the language the court used in Melkonian, 
both cases still used the framework of whether the petitioner’s fear was “objectively 
reasonable” and whether there was a “reasonable possibility” of persecution.135 The court 
also stated that it must evaluate the “likely treatment upon deportation to Iraq” and the 
“likely possibility of torture and/or execution for his involvement in the U. S.-led operation,” 
which correctly emphasized that the courts should focus on the possibility of facing 
persecution on account of a protected basis.136  
The Ninth Circuit set forth an evidentiary burden in Al-Harbi that clarified the 
probability of persecution that the asylum seeker needs to establish.137 As in other Ninth 
Circuit decisions, the court stated that it can determine whether an asylum seeker has 
satisfied the requisite burden of proof by evaluating whether the petitioner has offered 
“credible, direct, and specific evidence.”138 This case once again affirmed that “even a ten-
percent chance of persecution may establish a well-founded fear.”139 The Ninth Circuit 
followed the spirit of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cardoza-Fonseca’s and the Supreme 




129 Id.  
130 Id. at 892. 
131 Id. at 893.  
132 See Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003); Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 890 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
133 See Al-Harbi, 242 F.3d at 894. 
134 Id. at 891. 
135 See Melkonian, 320 F.3d at 1069; Al-Harbi, 242 F.3d at 890. 
136 Al-Harbi, 242 F.3d at 892, 94. 
137 Id. at 891. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 888. 
140 Id.  
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D. Eleventh Circuit Decisions 
The Eleventh Circuit analyzes the “objective” component differently from the other 
circuits by stating that asylum seekers have an objectively reasonable fear when they have 
a “good reason to fear future persecution” and by declining to use a percentage to 
conceptualize a well-founded fear. In Usmanov v. United States AG, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Usmanov’s fear of 
persecution was not objectively reasonable and denied Usmanov’s petition for review of 
the decision.141 In Uzbekistan, Usmanov gave a TV interview criticizing the government 
healthcare, was fired from his job, interrogated for hours, beaten, and prevented from 
working in the medical profession.142 The Mahalla,  neighborhood committees used by the 
Uzbek government to control the community, would often monitor and visit him.143 The 
main question was whether Usmanov had a well-founded fear of future persecution, and 
specifically, whether his fear of persecution based on imputed political opinion was 
objectively reasonable.144  
When the Eleventh Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s 
conclusions, the court listed all the evidence that weighed against Usmanov in no particular 
order and inappropriately used the objective component to address other elements such as 
level of persecution, nexus.145 For example, the court pointed to how Usmanov did not 
have an “objectively reasonable” fear of persecution but a fear of “mere harassment and 
intimidation” because the Mahalla visited and asked him questions but did not “threaten or 
harm him.” 146  By determining in the objectively well-founded fear analysis that 
Usmanov’s claim involved mere harassment and intimidation, the court concluded that the 
events he experienced did not rise to the level of persecution without clarifying that the 
court was analyzing this aspect of his case.147 The court also referred to how even though 
Usmanov was physically assaulted during the two to three hour interrogation and was being 
monitored by the Mahalla, he remained in Uzbekistan for eight years and even returned to 
Uzbekistan for two months.148 The court used his extended stay in Uzbekistan after an 
incident to point to how his fear is not objectively reasonable. However, what the court 
doubted was whether Usmanov actually faced suffering on account of a protected factor 
(nexus) when Usmanov’s imputed political opinion did not prevent him from living in 
Uzbekistan for a prolonged period of time.149 The court also questioned if the government 
was persecuting Usmanov on account of his imputed political opinion if Usmanov testified 
saying “the motivation to arrest him would be to extort money from him because the police 
would assume he was wealthy, having lived in a foreign country.”150  Here, the court 
assessed whether Usmanov belongs in a statutorily protected group, not whether his fear is 
well-founded.  
 
141 Usmanov v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 577 Fed. Appx. 920, 921, 925 (11th Cir. 2014). 
142 Id. at 922. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 921, 923. 
145 See Usmanov, 577 Fed. Appx. at 923. 
146 Id.  
147 See id. 
148 Id. at 923–24 
149 Id. at 923.  
150 Id. at 924. 
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The court treated “objectively reasonable fear” as just another analysis of all the 
components in the definition of a refugee without even identifying which components it 
was analyzing. The court should have analyzed each of the elements of being a refugee 
separately, not in the analysis regarding an “objectively reasonable” fear, if these elements 
truly were points of contention. Instead, the court engaged in a jumbled analysis that 
discussed other elements of proving one’s refugee status all under the objective component. 
Regardless of whether the court reached the correct decision, the court failed to effectively 
illustrate the meaning of an “objectively reasonable” fear, the very basis upon which the 
court ultimately denied the petition. 
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit mentioned the language of a “reasonable possibility” 
but did not explain what that meant or how this was different from “more likely than 
not.”151 The court stated that the evidentiary burden is having a “subjective and objective 
fear,” which means that the asylum seeker has to have a “good reason to fear future 
persecution.”152 Again, the court reiterated that the asylum seeker must have “specific, 
detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that she will be singled out for persecution on 
account of the statutorily protected factor.” 153  This is drastically different from the 
language that the Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit employed and appears to be a stricter 
standard than the ones that the other courts used. The Seventh Circuit referred to “a 
reasonable possibility of actually suffering such persecution” and the Ninth Circuit pointed 
to how a 10% chance of persecution is sufficient to establish a well-founded fear.154 The 
Eleventh Circuit’s language of “good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for 
persecution” suggests a higher burden of proof than the Seventh and Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretations since a “good reason” seems to require more justification than a “reasonable 
possibility” or a 10% chance of persecution.  
The court in Usmanov cited Najjar v. Ashcroft to find support for its use of “good 
reason to fear” language to interpret the meaning of an objectively reasonable fear.155 In 
Najjar v. Ashcroft, a Palestinian Muslim couple were denied asylum because they failed to 
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of any statutory factor that was 
supported by substantial evidence.156 In Najjar, the court stated that well-founded fear 
means having a “good reason to fear” persecution.157 Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Najjar cited to Mgoian v. INS, a Ninth Circuit case, in order to draw authority for its “good 
reason to fear” language.158 Yet, the Ninth Circuit directly stated in the Mgoian opinion 
that “the question is whether Mgoian presented sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
a reasonable fear of persecution in a similarly situated applicant.”159 Furthermore, as seen 
in the previous cases, the Ninth Circuit has not referenced this language of “good fear” 
very often in its own cases. Thus, delving into what the circuit courts cite to justify their 
 
151 See id. at 923. 
152 Id. at 923. 
153 Id. (first emphasis added) (quoting Forgue v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 
2005)).  
154 See Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003); Bereza v. INS, 115 F.3d 468, 474 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (quoting C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)). 
155 Usmanov, 577 Fed. Appx. at 923. 
156 Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1270, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001). 
157 Id. at 1289. 
158 Id.  
159 Mgoian v. INS., 184 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 
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differing standards not only shows how courts analyze objectively reasonable fear in 
strikingly different ways but also how the circuit courts are prone to use the standard that 
they desire depending on the case.  
In the end, the Eleventh Circuit fails to mention what the BIA and other circuit courts 
have stated: an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution if a “reasonable person in 
[his or] her circumstances would fear persecution if [he or] she were to be returned to [his 
or] her native country.”160 The court also fails to emphasize that an objectively reasonable 
fear of persecution must be “in light of the circumstances” of the asylum seeker.161 Finally, 
the Eleventh Circuit declines to assert that a 10% possibility of persecution would be 
sufficient to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution.  
In fact, the Eleventh Circuit's asylum cases serve as an example of how the circuit 
courts are susceptible to using a standard that is higher than the standard that it should be 
imposing according to Cardoza-Fonseca. 162  In Sepulveda v. U.S. Atty. General, the 
petitioner argued that the IJ applied a heightened standard of “more likely than not,” thus 
violating the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca. 163  The Eleventh 
Circuit simply stated that there was  no indication in the record the IJ applied an incorrect 
standard.164 The court pointed to how the IJ used the language of “reasonable possibility” 
rather than the “more likely than not” standard.165 However, the court did not review what 
the IJ actually considered in terms of evidence but restated the standard that the IJ 
supposedly used.166  
For example, the court in Sepulveda did not examine whether the IJ actually imposed 
a higher burden of proof by demanding more evidence besides the asylum seeker’s own 
accounts of threatening phone calls and death threats and a bomb being placed in her 
mailbox.167 The court did not explain at what point the evidence that the IJ demands would 
violate the Cardoza-Fonseca standard and require the asylum seeker to prove that her fear 
of persecution would more likely than not occur if she returned to Colombia. Part of this 
lack of specificity is due to the fact that the BIA and the various courts have not come to a 
conclusion about what probability of persecution an asylum seeker has to establish. The 
vagueness in the standard allows for such claims about the courts using an improper 
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III. THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF A CONVOLUTED OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE WELL-
FOUNDED FEAR 
A. Challenges for Practitioners 
First, the confusing nature of the objective analysis has led to inefficiency for 
attorneys practicing asylum law.168 Because the well-founded fear analysis is now split into 
the two components of a subjective and objective fear, courts have been using the objective 
component to evaluate all of the asylum seeker’s evidence. Because the well-founded fear 
analysis has become a separate, substantive analysis that is different from proving 
persecution on account of a nexus factor, attorneys have to use the same evidence in order 
to establish that asylum seekers have a reasonably objective fear for the well-founded fear 
analysis and separately prove persecution, belonging in a protected class, and the nexus 
between the two elements.169 The analysis becomes repetitive because the same evidence 
is advanced to prove two very similar elements. Furthermore, the vagueness of the well-
founded fear standard, and therefore the objective component, has made it difficult for 
practitioners to know what evidence they must present in their briefs. Practitioners face 
adverse findings when courts implicitly use a standard that is different from the ones the 
practitioners are applying, or the courts impermissibly use a standard that violates the more 
generous standard provided in Cardoza-Fonseca. 
B. Increasing the Likelihood of Bias to Affect Decisions 
In addition, failing to clarify the objective fear standard can lead asylum officers and 
other judges to rely more heavily upon their own biases and personal inclinations rather 
than a straightforward legal analysis. Cardoza-Fonseca left behind a great amount of room 
for inconsistent proceedings. At most, the more generous evidentiary standard would mean 
that adjudicators should consider asylum seekers’ home country conditions and their state 
of mind more in asylum cases.170 However, because of the confusion of how to properly 
apply the well-founded fear standard, immigration courts, the BIA, and circuit courts are 
likely to continue to defer to State Department opinions and BIA decisions that often are 
adversarial towards asylum seekers.171 This is detrimental in proceedings where the denial 
of an application could mean condemning a person to death.   
The lack of clarity regarding the well-founded fear standard makes asylum seekers 
even more vulnerable to the implicit biases of immigration judges.172 They face more 
obstacles in engaging in meticulous, thoughtful analysis due to their high caseloads, and 
often are plagued with low motivation resulting from the high levels of stress and 
burnout.173 Moreover, the cases they have to adjudicate are legally and factually complex 
cases, and less experienced judges may unknowingly rely more on mental shortcuts and 
 
168 I became aware of this issue when I talked to my clinical professor who is in charge of the Immigration 
Clinic at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Confusion regarding the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the “well-founded fear” standard has created redundancies in the legal analysis for asylum cases.  
169 Supra Part II. 
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37 AM. U.L. REV. 915, 945. 
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172 Fatma E. Marouf, Crossing The Border: The Future Of Immigration Law and Its Impact On Lawyers: 
Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 New Eng. L. Rev. 417, 418 (2011). 
173 Id. at 431–36. 
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biases rather than proper application of the law.174 Yet, their decisions hold a lot of power 
as they are the initial factfinders, and their decisions receive limited review by BIA and the 
federal court of appeals.175  
Research confirms that officers and judges are prone to rely on their previous 
preconceptions, and the lack of clear and consistent standards in asylum proceedings does 
not ameliorate this dangerous reality.176 The statistics regarding how asylum officers and 
judges adjudicate their claims based on gender, previous work experience, and other factors 
show that the judges are already prone to decide based on their own biases and 
prejudices. 177  Clear interpretations with precise language would make judges more 
accountable by forcing them to explain their justifications in a more coherent way and 
encouraging them to base their decisions on legal standards rather than their own prejudices. 
The authors of Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication aptly express how 
“particularly discomfiting” it is to know that the outcome of a case is strongly influenced 
by an identity or attitude of the officer or judge when an erroneously denied application 
will almost always mean being deported back to a country where the person’s life is in 
danger.178 Thus, the high stakes in asylum cases mandates a change that will allow for more 
fair and consistent proceedings.  
IV. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF PERSECUTION ANALYSIS 
Although the Supreme Court wanted to clarify the meaning of well-founded fear in 
Cardoza-Fonseca, the BIA and the circuit courts have used the Supreme Court’s 
observations regarding a subjective and objective component in a well-founded fear and 
transformed it into a separate convoluted analysis in future persecution claims.179 The 
unnecessarily elaborate analysis has not only led to inconsistent proceedings within the 
BIA and the circuit courts but also created additional burdens for asylum seekers who have 
to proffer the same kind of evidence multiple times in their asylum application. In addition, 
some courts may still reject applications with any objective evidence that counters an 
asylum seeker’s claim and find a lack of a well-founded fear, even though some courts 
interpret a well-founded fear as a 10% chance of persecution.180  
Courts should stop using the subjective language to interpret the statutory language 
of a well-founded fear because an asylum seeker’s subjective fear should be presumed if 
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176 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in 
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. R., 265 (2010). 
177 Id. The article provided the following data: female judges granted asylum 53.8% of the time while male 
judges granted asylum 37.3% of the time. Id. at 342. Judges’ previous work experience also seemed to 
affect how they adjudicated asylum cases. Id. at 346. A judge that had done no work for INS/DHS granted 
asylum 48.2% of the time, but those who had 11 or more years of experience with these agencies only 
granted asylum 31.3% of the time. Id. The research also showed that those who had government experience 
(minus INS or DHS experience) were granted asylum at a rate of 39.6%, and those who had no government 
experience granted asylum at a rate of 47.1% (a difference of 19%). Id. at 348. Those with non-profit 
organizations granted asylum 55.4% of the time, and those with no NPO experience granted asylum 41.4% 
of the time. Id. at 346. 
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the person submits an application. This component adds nothing substantive to the analysis; 
if asylum applicants can make a showing that they fulfilled the evidentiary burden of 
proving that they have a well-founded fear, then the asylum seekers should be presumed to 
have a fear of returning to their country. The Ninth Circuit illustrated how the subjective 
component does not hold much weight in an asylum proceeding when it concluded that 
applicants could have a subjective fear of returning to their native country even if their own 
testimonies were not credible. 181 The court relied on the fact that there was evidence that 
other asylum seekers who evacuated from their country at the same time as the asylum 
seeker did have a genuine subjective fear.182 Furthermore, the court states that “most people 
are sensible enough to harbor a genuine fear of persecution if the actual likelihood of 
persecution is high,” demonstrating that if there is sufficient objective evidence showing a 
reasonable person would fear persecution, the subjective fear should be a given.183  
Second, the Supreme Court should discard the objectively reasonable language. A 
well-founded fear should simply be interpreted as “a reasonable possibility of persecution.” 
The Supreme Court should clarify that a well-founded fear is not a separate element that 
asylum seekers need to prove when establishing future persecution but an evidentiary 
burden that refers to the likelihood of the persecution based on established facts. A 
reasonable possibility should be determined to be a more generous standard of at least a 
10% chance of persecution, as the Supreme Court suggested in Cardoza-Fonseca when it 
stated in a hypothetical example that an adult male person who faced a 10% chance of 
being put to death or sent to a remote labor camp would have a well-founded fear of 
persecution upon his return.184  
Moreover, the central analysis should not be about the 10% chance of persecution 
but should focus on whether the asylum applicant has established each element needed to 
prove refugee status. Courts should evaluate each element of refugee status separately and 
see if a person fears harms that rise to the level of persecution, the person is in a protected 
group, and there is a nexus between the persecution and the protected group. After 
producing a structured analysis, the court can briefly determine if the asylum seeker has 
met the threshold of facing at least a 10% chance of persecution based on whether the 
asylum seeker has sufficiently established each element of being a refugee. Changing the 
way courts interpret a well-founded fear would help eliminate the repetitive analysis that 
is often caused by the objective component.  
CONCLUSION 
Although determining whether an asylum seeker has properly met an evidentiary 
burden is a difficult process, there must still be a threshold that allows adjudicators to have 
a frame of reference and to decide cases in a more consistent manner. Failing to come to a 
consensus about the interpretation of well-founded fear will only lead courts to apply the 
burden of proof that they want in any given case. The ambiguity regarding an objectively 
reasonable well-founded fear can allow adjudicators to say they are denying an applicant 
because the applicant’s claim had no objective basis. The objective component can 
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sometimes mask the fact that the adjudicators did not sufficiently analyze the asylum 
seeker’s claim before rejecting the application. The BIA and other judges may also be 
misapplying the standard that is needed for an objective fear because there is so much 
ambiguity in the well-founded fear standard. The dangers of using the ambiguous language 
of an objectively reasonable well-founded fear are too striking to ignore. The disparities in 
asylum adjudication due to the confusion about how to apply the various components of a 
well-founded fear cannot progress any further when asylum seekers’ lives continue to be 
jeopardized every day in United States courts.   
